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The backdoor was used to target financial and military organizations in Eastern Europe...

CactusPete (also known as Karma Panda or Tonto Team) is an APT group that has been publicly known since at least 2013. Some of the group’s activities have been previously described in public by multiple sources. We have been investigating and privately reporting on this group’s activity for years as well. Historically, their activity has been focused on military, diplomatic and infrastructure targets in Asia and Eastern Europe.

This is also true of the group’s latest activities.

A new CactusPete campaign, spotted at the end of February 2020 by Kaspersky, shows that the group’s favored types of target remain the same. The victims of the new variant of the Bisonal backdoor, according to our telemetry, were from financial and military sectors located in Eastern Europe. Our research started from only one sample, but by using the Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE) we found 300+ almost identical samples. All of them appeared between March 2019 and April 2020. This underlines the speed of CactusPete’s development – more than 20 samples per month. The target location forced the group to use a hardcoded Cyrillic codepage during string manipulations. This is important, for example, during remote shell functionality, to correctly handle the Cyrillic output from executed commands.

The method of malware distribution for the new campaign remains unknown, but previous campaigns indicate that it’s their usual way of distributing malware. The attackers’ preferred way to deliver malware is spear-phishing messages with “magic” attachments. The attachments never contain zero-day exploits, but they do include recently discovered and patched vulnerabilities, or any other crafty approaches that might help them deliver the payload. Running these attachments leads to infection.

Once the malware starts it tries to reach a hardcoded C2. The communication takes place using the unmodified HTTP-based protocol, the request and response body are RC4-encrypted, and the encryption key is also hardcoded into the sample. As the result of the RC4 encryption may contain binary data, the malware additionally encodes it in BASE64, to match the HTTP specification.